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LEGISLATION: COOPERATION AS THE KEY TO




The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978' was enacted by the United
States Congress to protect Indian children and to promote the
stability and security of Indian tribes. 2 Congress had found that
an alarmingly high percentage of Indian children were being
removed from their homes by nontribal agencies and that, in
exercising their jurisdiction, the states were often failing to
recognize tribal relationships and the culture of the Indian
communities.'
In response to these troubling discoveries, Congress declared a
national policy regarding Indian. children:
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation
to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote
the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the
establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal
of Indian children from their families and the placement of
such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the
unique values of Indian culture, and by providing for
assistance to Indian tribes in the operation of child and family
service programs."
In order to realize this policy Congress fixed the jurisdictional
rights and responsibilities of the tribes and the states.' Before the
passage of the Act, jurisdiction was dependent on case law.
6
Under the Act the tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over certain
Indian child custody proceedings; the states must transfer
proceedings in certain circumstances; and the tribes have a right
to intervene in any state court proceeding involving foster care,
placement of, or termination of parental rights to an Indian
child.7 The gist of the Act is that the Indian tribes will have con-
1. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1978).
2. Id. § 1902.
3. Id. § 1901(4), (5).
4. Id. § 1902.
5. Id. § 1911.
6. See Wakefield v. Little Light, 347 A.2d 228 (Md. 1975). This case contains a
summary of case law bearing on jurisdictional issues in child custody cases arising before
the passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act.
7. 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (1978).
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trol (to a degree determined by the tribes) of the placement of In-
dian children.
The Indian Child Welfare Act offers a prime opportunity for
Indians to inhibit the destruction of their culture and to revitalize
their tribes. Of equal importance is the opportunity to end the
suffering and trauma imposed on Indian children by an unsympa-
thetic culture.
These are ambitious goals, the attainment of which will require
the curing of the destructive effects of actions that have been oc-
curring for nearly half of a millenium. That the tribes will have
jurisdiction or the right to intervene in child custody proceedings
is not enough to overcome the past deprivations and attain these
goals. Success will require placement and family service
resources.
Most tribes, particularly in Oklahoma, have few child place-
ment resources in the forms of foster homes and institutions. In
Oklahoma most of these kinds of placement resources are main-
tained by the state of Oklahoma through its Department of
Human Services. Other placement facilities that may be needed as
child placement resources are maintained by the state of
Oklahom4 through the Department of Mental Health.
The relationship between Oklahoma tribes and these two state
agencies, with respect to the allocation of the resources controlled
by these agencies to meet the objectives of the Indian Child
Welfare Act, is the subject of this note. The theme of this
analysis is that the lopsided allocation of resources between tribal
and state governments makes cooperation between the two
governments essential to the fulfillment of the Act.
An appraisal of attempts to allocate these resources through
tribal court orders will be made. Of necessity, this appraisal is a
discussion of the fundamental state-tribal relationship, including
the meaning of tribal sovereignty in the context of the Indian
Child Welfare Act. The appraisal will show that tribal court
orders alone are ineffective as instruments of resource realloca-
tion; it is followed by a plan for making these resources accessible
to the tribes. Finally, any monetary obligations arising from the
use of these resources will be discussed.
Tribal Sovereignty as a Factor in Resource Allocation
The most obvious way for a tribe to try to gain access to child
placement resources of state agencies is for the tribal court to
issue an order vesting custody of a child in a state agency. The ef-




That tribal governments are sovereigns vis-h-vis the states was
recognized by the United States Supreme Court one hundred fifty
years ago in Worcester v. Georgia.' The years since Worcester
have seen much confusion and contradictory policies in regard to
Indian tribes, but one principle remains-tribal governments are
not part of state governments.
The nature of the relationship between tribal government and
state government has been blurred by the simultaneous state
citizenship and tribal membership of Indians. The dual citizen-
ship of Indians has led to confusion as to the limits of the
jurisdiction of the two entities. Viewing the tribes and states in
the context of their mutual independence brings into focus their
relationship as sovereigns.
It is a well settled conflict of laws principle that the laws of one
sovereign are not binding on another sovereign.' The United
States Supreme Court has phrased the rule, "No law has any ef-
fect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from
which its authority is derived." 10
The Supreme Court recently offered some clarification in
determining the limits of a sovereign in relation to another
sovereign. In Bigelow v. Virginia" the Court, considering
whether a Virginia court could by its actions in effect bar a New
York abortion clinic from advertising its services in Virginia
where such advertising was illegal, said, "A State does not ac-
quire power or supervision over the internal affairs of another
state merely because the welfare and health of its own citizens
may be affected when they travel to the other state." The appli-
cation of Bigelow to the tribal-state relationship establishes that
neither the tribe's nor the state's jurisdiction is extended to the in-
ternal affairs of the other merely because the actions of each may
affect Indians as individuals.
The one reported case that even remotely deals with the effect
of a tribal order on a state agency supports the conclusion that
the order is not binding on the agency. The material facts of this
case, White v. Califano,'2 are as follows. Florence Red Dog, a
member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, was determined by an Indian
Health Service worker to be in need of psychiatric treatment. The
8. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
9. 15A C.J.S., Conflict of Laws, § 4 (1967).
10. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895).
11. 421 U.S. 809, 824 (1975).
12. 437 F. Supp. 543 (D.S.D. 1977), aff'd, 581 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1978).
1980] NOTES
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state of South Dakota declined to file a petition for her commit-
ment on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over an Indian
residing on the reservation. The tribal judge, acting on a petition
of the Indian Health Service worker, ordered Ms. Red Dog to be
committed to a facility administered by the state of South
Dakota. South Dakota did not acknowledge the order and main-
tained that it had no jurisdiction.
The issue presented to the United States District Court was
whether Ms. Red Dog was entitled to state services on the basis of
equal protection. The state's defense was that it had no jurisdic-
tion and could not attain jurisdiction through its court system.
The district court, agreeing with the state, asserted that the state
was barred from exercising jurisdiction over an Indian residing on
the reservation by the limit (infringement test) set in Williams v.
Lee. 13
The plaintiff, the defendant, and the court ignored the tribal
court order and did not discuss the possibility of its having any
bearing on the issue of jurisdiction. By implication, the court af-
firmed that the conflict of laws principle that the law of one
sovereign is not binding on another sovereign applies to the rela-
tionship between tribal and state governments.
An important ramification of the principles and examples that
have been discussed is that tribal sovereignty has been firmly
recognized-with one exception. The Sioux Tribal Court in White
v. Califano did not recognize and respect its own sovereignty. By
trying to exercise jurisdiction over another sovereign, the Sioux
Tribe violated the basic doctrines by which sovereigns deal with
one another. This action on the part of an Indian tribe muddies
the concept of its own sovereignty, contributes to the hostility of
state governments toward Indian governments, and invites intru-
sion by the states into Indian governments. A tribe demeans itself
by behaving as though it is a quasi-state entity.
This self-defeating conduct is particularly serious in the context
of the Indian Child Welfare Act."' Respect for and recognition of
tribal sovereignty on the part of tribal members, as well as those
outside the tribe, is vital to a tribe's development of the will, the
pride, and the power to make real the promise of the Indian
Child Welfare Act.
The necessity of tribal sovereignty to the fulfillment of the In-
dian Child Welfare Act creates a vicious circle for the tribes. It
13. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).




appears that this very sovereignty, by depriving the tribes of ac-
cess to important resources, could actually work to prevent their
full participation in the decisions concerning their children. If a
tribe does not have jurisdiction to place Indian children in state
facilities, it is faced with the choice either of denying these ser-
vices to Indian children who need them or acquiescing to the
state's exercise of jurisdiction over these children.
There are placement resources over which a tribe could acquire
jurisdiction. These resources are limited for practical purposes to
those placements set out in the Act as preferred placements for
Indian children (e.g., foster families, extended families).'" Such
placements are not always available. When a tribe has to decline
jurisdiction over a proceeding involving a child for whom no such
placement exists, the purpose of the Act is frustrated.
The Indian child for whom no preferred placement is available
is as valuable a resource to the tribe as children for whom one of
the preferred placements is available. Such a hard-to-place child
needs the protection of the tribe as much as, if not more than, the
child for whom a preferred placement is available. It is these
hard-to-place children who are likely to become "lost" in the
nontribal juvenile justice system and suffer the consequences the
Act was designed to avoid. Must their tribe abandon these
children?
Under the Act a tribe can have a role in state court pro-
ceedings. A tribe may become a party at any point in such a state
court proceeding. 6 As a party, a tribe could introduce evidence
and cross-examine witnesses. However, all of this information
would be presented to a nontribal judge who will make the final
decision.
One action a tribe can take in state court is to petition for
transfer of the proceeding to tribal court, according to section
1911(b) of the Act. It seems obvious, however, that a tribe would
not petition for transfer and would decline to assume jurisdiction
upon petition for transfer by any other party if the child concerned
is one in need of services that his tribe cannot acquire for him.
Moreover, if, during the hearing in state court, it became ap-
parent that the child did not need placement in a state facility and
the tribe could provide the needed services, transfer to tribal
court at that point would bring added stress to the child.
The importance of a tribe having jurisdiction over a child to
15. Id. § 1915(b).
16. Id. § 1911(c).
1980]
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determine his initial placement is evident. Just as important is the
tribe's continued supervision of the child's care after he is placed
initially.
The commitment of an Indian child to a state agency brings to
bear on that child and his family a powerful system that has often
been unaware of and unresponsive to the special factors and
forces bearing on an Indian child and his tribe.' 7 For example,
once committed to the Department of Human Services (of
Oklahoma), the child can be placed until he is eighteen years old
according to the policies of that department. Placement changes
by the Department of Human Services do not require a court
hearing. While the Indian Child Welfare Act provides that
changes of placement shall be in accordance with the Act, 8 there
is no provision in it for intervention by the tribe in internal place-
ment changes. Records of such placements must be made
available for inspection by the tribe;"9 but, if the child has been
committed by a state court, the tribe is limited to petitioning a
nontribal court to invalidate the action.
20
While this action might be effective, tribal court jurisdiction
would be a more powerful presence. The tribal court, having
jurisdiction, could remove the child from Department of Human
Services' custody whenever the tribal court determined that the
services being provided were in contravention to the Act or to
tribal well-being. An important aspect of this power would be the
tribal court's ability to remove the Indian child from custody
when he is no longer in need of the intervention of state agencies.
A significant consequence of a tribal court retaining jurisdic-
tion is the synergistic effect that tribal involvement with individ-
ual Indian children would have on the tribal and nontribal
juvenile justice systems. The tribe's awareness of problems that
tribal families face would be increased, and the tribe's efforts to
meet these problems through resource development would be
encouraged. Through its active participation in the treatment of
its Indian children, a tribe would establish itself as an entity
participating in the nontribal juvenile justice system. Flowing
from this recognition would be the routine inclusion of Indian
judges and child-care workers in organizations, nontribal as well
as tribal, that influence child-care policies.
17. Id. § 1901(5).
18. Id. § 1916(b).
19. Id. § 1915(e).




The tribe's having to decline jurisdiction because of its not
having tribal resources or access to state resources that can meet
Indian children's needs will delay, if not dilute, the impact of the
Indian Child Welfare Act. The power given a tribe under the Act
to monitor what happens to its children who come under the
state's jurisdiction' is helpful, but in the absence of tribal court
jurisdiction a tribe cannot assume its most effective role. This
disabling of tribal courts because of their lack of resources must
and can be overcome.
A Plan for Oklahoma Indians
Section 1919 of the Act " authorizes Indian tribes to enter into
agreements with the states respecting the care and custody of In-
dian children. The Act has no provision requiring a state to enter
into any agreement with the tribes; nor does the Act ensure a
speedy agreement process.
The tribes must take the initiative to gain access to state
children's placement resources. Yet, how can tribes accomplish
this if a state is under no obligation to cooperate with tribal
governments?
In Oklahoma the answer lies in the Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children 3 and the Interstate Compact on Mental
Health. 4 These two compacts provide the means for the tribes to
overcome jurisdictional barriers to their using state resources
maintained by the Department of Human Services and the
Department of Mental Health. The following examination of
these compacts shows their value as potential tools for tribal
governments.
The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children "5 is a
jurisdictional instrument through which Oklahoma and forty-six
other states have provided for the interstate placement of
children .2 The purpose of the compact is to provide a vehicle for
cooperation among party states. It has the effect of making it
possible to operate across state lines much as one would operate
within a single state.28
21. Id. § 1915(e).
22. Id. § 1919(a).
23. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 571 (Supp. 1980).
24. 43A OKLA. S1AT. § 501 (Supp. 1980).
25. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 571 (Supp. 1980).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. American Public Welfare Association, Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children, Compact Administrators' Manual 2.5 (1977).
19801
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From the legal point of view, Article V, "Retention of
Jurisdiction," is this compact's core.29 Paragraph (a) of this arti-
cle provides:
The sending agency shall retain jurisdiction over the child suffi-
cient to determine all matters in relation to the custody, super-
vision, care, treatment and disposition of the child which it
would have had if the child had remained in the sending agen-
cy's state, until the child is adopted, reaches majority, becomes
self-supporting or is discharged with the concurrence of the ap-
propriate authority in the receiving state. Such jurisdiction
shall also include the power to effect or cause the return of the
child or its transfer to another location and custody pursuant
to law.3"
By retaining jurisdiction over these specified matters, the sending
agency extends its protection to the child even while the child is
placed in another jurisdiction.
The interstate jurisdictional arrangements become of opera-
tional significance when the placement fails or is to be terminated
for some other reason. Without the compact, the sending agency
would be powerless to intervene in another jurisdiction on behalf
of the child. Under the compact the sending agency not only has
jurisdiction but is actually obligated to remove the child.
One provision of the compact might be seen as a loophole by
which state agencies could avoid providing services. The compact
affords the receiving state the opportunity and requirement to
determine whether the proposed placement is suitable.3" Article
III, paragraph (d)32 of the compact says that the appropriate
authorities in the receiving state shall determine "that the proposed
placement does not appear to be contrary to the interests of the
child." The spirit in which this requirement is to be met is ex-
pressed in the Compact Administrator's Manual as follows:
The language of the Compact is carefully chosen. It is stated in
the negative because it is unreasonable to expect a finding that
the placement is the best that could possibly be imagined for
the child. Most children might be appropriately placed in a
number of alternative homes and environments, any of which
would be satisfactory. Accordingly, the only requirement for a
29. Id. at 2.4.
30. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 571 (art. I(a)) (Supp. 1980).
31. Id. (art. InI(d)).
32. Id. § 571.
[Vol. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol8/iss2/7
finding is that the proposed placement is reasonable and
satisfactory considering all the relevant circumstances.
33
The receiving state is not likely to find that placement in one of
its state-operated foster homes or institutions is contrary to this
standard. Thus, careful reading of the statute in light of the in-
tent of the compact shows this provision not to be an avenue for
a state to avoid its obligations under the compact.
The value of the compact to Indian tribes is readily seen. By
joining the compact a tribe could overcome the jurisdictional
disabilities separating it from state children's placement
resources. A tribal court could retain jurisdiction over its tribe's
children without depriving them of state services, thus effec-
tuating the Indian Child Welfare Act.34
Another way the tribes could gain access to state services is
through the Interstate Compact on Mental Health. 3' This com-
pact was enacted for the purpose of providing treatment for the
mentally ill regardless of their residence or citizenship .36
A fundamental difference between the Interstate Compact on
Mental Health and the Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children is that the sending agency does not retain jurisdiction
under the Mental Health Compact. 37 This feature is usually con-
sidered to be of little moment to the courts as the clinical nature
of the decisions concerning the treatment of the patient is thought
to make interference by the courts inappropriate.
For the purpose of monitoring child placement resources, it is
not important for the tribes to retain jurisdiction over these
placements because the Department of Mental Health is not in
the business of providing residential care for normally function-
ing children and, presumably, will not be inclined to retain
custody of a child when he is not in need of mental health care
services. The importance of the Interstate Compact on Mental
Health to a tribe is that through its participation in the Mental
Health Compact, a tribal, rather than a nontribal, court would
determine whether an Indian child needs to be placed in a mental
33. Compact Administrators' Manual 2.3. There is no case law interpreting this sec-
tion. This information comes from the interpretive summary in the Compact Admini-
strators' Manual which governs the administration of the compact in accordance with ar-
ticle VII of the compact.
34. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1978).
35. 43A OKLA. STAT. § 501 (Supp. 1980).
36. Id. (art. I).
37. Id. (art. VII(a)).
19801 NOTES
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health facility and thus it would retain power over the child's
guardianship38
One obstacle to a tribe taking advantage of the Interstate Com-
pact on the Placement of Children and the Interstate Compact on
Mental Health is the joinder provision of each compact. Indian
tribes are not expressly included in the list of those eligible to join
the compacts.
The joinder clause of the Interstate Compact on the Placement
of Children provides for joinder by any state, territory, or posses-
sion of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico, and, with the consent of Congress, the
government of Canada or any province thereof.39 The Interstate
Compact on Mental Health includes the same entities except for
Canada.
It is submitted that for the purposes of these compacts Indian
tribes should be included within the definition of territories.
There is support for this proposal. According to the United States
Supreme Court, the determination of the territorial status of an
entity "within the meaning of any particular statutory or con-
stitutional provision depends upon the character and aim of the
specific provision involved."4 "
An analysis of two of the Court's decisions as to the territorial
status of the District of Columbia demonstrates the application
of this principle.4 In Embry v. Palmer42 the Court held that the
District of Columbia was a territory for purposes of the enabling
legislation of 1804.11 But, in District of Columbia v. Carter,44 the
Court decided that the District of Columbia was not a territory
for purposes of certain civil rights legislation.
This principle has been applied to determine the territorial
status of an Indian tribe for purposes of particular legislation. '
The Cherokee Nation was accorded territorial status for the pur-
poses of the enabling legislation of 1812 in Mackey v. Coxe.46
38. Id. (art. VIII).
39. 10 OKLA. SrAT. § 571 (art. IX) (Supp. 1980).
40. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 420 (1972) (emphasis added).
41. Ragsdale, Problems in the Application of Full Faith and Credit for Indian
Tribes, 7 N.M. L. REv. 133, 137-38 (1977).
42. 107 U.S. 3 (1882).
43. Act of Mar. 27, 1804, ch. 56, 2 Stat. 298.
44. 409 U.S. 418 (1972).
45. Ragsdale, Problems in the Application or full Faith and Credit for Indian
Tribes, 7 N.M. L. REv. 133, 138 (1977).




The construction of "territory" in the context of the purposes
and intents of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children and the Interstate Compact on Mental Health would
result in the tribes being considered territories for purposes of
these compacts. The intent of the Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children is to maximize opportunities for children
through overcoming jurisdictional barriers. 47 The Interstate Com-
pact on Mental Health bespeaks a similar purpose.48 From a
reading of the provisions of the compacts in light of these intents
to alleviate the jurisdictional barriers standing between a child
and his receiving proper care, it is apparent that the tribes should
be considered territories for purposes of enabling them to join
these compacts.
Financial Responsibility Under the Compacts
The final hurdle the tribes would face in their quest to gain
placement resources from the states is financial. Most tribes
would be unable to bear the cost of keeping a child in an institu-
tion or foster care. If the tribes must pay for these services, they
are effectively cut off from state resources.
The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children speaks
to this issue. Article V, paragraph (a) 9 provides that the sending
agency shall continue to have financial responsibility for support
and maintenance of the child during the period of the placement.
The key word is "continue." The compact does not assign initial
financial responsibility. It simply clarifies that participation in the
compact does not shift financial responsibility. Whether the
tribes must pay for foster care services received from the state
through the compact depends upon who is initially financially
responsible for these services. A tribe obviously would not con-
tinue to be responsible for something for which it has never been
responsible.
Of the few cases in which the right of Indians to state
assistance (i.e., a state's responsibility to provide services for In-
dians) was at issue,50 most resulted in holdings that Indians are
47. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 571 (art. I) (Supp. 1980).
48. 43A OKLA. STAT. § 501 (art. I) (Supp. 1980).
49. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 571 (Supp. 1980).
50. See Arizona v. Hobby, 221 F.2d 498 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Acosta v. San Diego
County, 126 Cal. App. 2d 455, 272 P.2d 92 (1954); County of Beltrami v. County of
Hennepin, 119 N.W.2d 25 (Minn. 1963); State ex rel. Williams v. Kemp, 78 P.2d 585
(Mont. 1938).
19801
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eligible for state assistance.' Neither the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, the federal courts in the Tenth Circuit, nor the United
States Supreme Court have ruled on this issue. However, the
United States Supreme Court has indicated its position.
In Morton v. Ruiz," a case dealing with the eligibility of off-
reservation Indians for BIA relief assistance, the Court cited with
approval the holding in State ex rel. Williams v. Kemp, 3 a case in
which the Montana Supreme Court held that the state was
responsible for the relief of Indians. The Supreme Court further
stated by way of dictum in Morton: "Any Indian, whether living
on a reservation or elsewhere, may be eligible for benefits under
the various social security programs in which his State partici-
pates and no limitation may be placed on social security benefits
because of an Indian claimant's residence on a reservation." 54
Even though the Court has not ruled on the specific issue of
the right of Indians to state assistance, the Court's position seems
clear. The conclusion may safely be drawn that Indians are eligi-
ble to receive aid from state government if the program is at least
partially funded through the federal Social Security Act. 5
In Oklahoma the foster care program of the Department of
Human Services is funded largely through Title XXI" of the
Social Security Act." Two of the state institutions where deprived
children and children in need of supervision (the adjudications of
Indian children under tribal jurisdiction) can be placed are
designated to be funded partially through Title XX. 8 Thus, In-
dian children who are Oklahoma residents are entitled to foster
care and institutional placement from the state of Oklahoma.
Since Oklahoma must provide foster care and institutional
placement for Indian children without a right of reimbursement,
and since the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children
does not alter the financial responsibilities, a tribe that places a
child pursuant to the provisions of the compact would not bear
51. For an analysis of these cases, see Note, Indian Rights: Eligibility of Indiansfor
State Assistance, 4 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 289 (1976).
52. 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
53. 78 P.2d 585 (Mont. 1938).
54. 415 U.S. 199, 208 (1974).
55. See Note, Indian Rights: Eligibility of Indians for State Assistance, 4 AM. IN-
DIAN L. REv. 289 (1976).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1397 (1980).
57. Department of Human Services, Proposed Title XX Comprehensive Services
Plan of the State of Oklahoma, Program Period July 1, 1981 through June 30, 1984, 12
(1981).




the financial responsibility for the child's support and
maintenance in an Oklahoma state institution.
The Interstate Compact on Mental Health is silent as to pay-
ment for services. It is not clear what financial arrangements are
intended. Because the receiving state gains full jurisdiction over
the person sent,5 9 a logical presumption is that under this com-
pact the receiving state assumes financial responsibility for the
patient.
The federal government was held to be responsible for mental
health services provided to Indians in White v. Califano,60 an
Eighth Circuit case not involving the Interstate Compact on Men-
tal Health. Coupling the presumption under the Mental Health
Compact with the holding in White v. Califano leads to the con-
clusion that any dispute over responsibility for payment for ser-
vices rendered under the Mental Health Compact would properly
be between the state and the federal governments.
Conclusion
The Indian Child Welfare Act provides an opportunity for the
Indian tribes to influence a system that for too long has inflicted
untold heartache and trauma on Indian children, their families,
and their tribes.
Central to the success of the tribes in realizing the promise of
the Act is the concept of tribal sovereignty. This concept can be
enhanced by the tribes' participation, to the fullest extent their
resources will allow, in the determination of what happens to
their people.
The tribes can increase the resources available to them, and
thus their influence on the system, by overcoming barriers that
stand between them and resources maintained by the states. By
cooperating under existing compacts, with their established pro-
cedures for overcoming these barriers, the tribes and the states
could unite for the good of Indian children and yet each could
assert themselves as sovereigns in ways understandable and legally
palatable to the other.
Responsible actions and a spirit of cooperation on the part of
both the tribes and the states can make the promise of the Indian
Child Welfare Act a reality.
59. 43A OKLA. STAT. § 501 (art. VII(a)) (Supp. 1980).
60. 437 F. Supp. 543 (D.S.D. 1977), aff'd, 581 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1978).
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